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VOLUME XV SPRING, 1961 NUMBER 3
ANTITRUST GOALS AND CURRENT ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAMS
ROBERT A. BICKS*
Recent antitrust convictions have brought public attention to
bear on this aspect of the business world. The author, the prime
mover behind these convictions, herein discusses some of the goals
and present enforcement procedures of the Department of Justice.
This analysis emphasizes the prior prevention rather than the subse-
quent destruction of corporate mergers which threaten to obstruct
the flow of competitive enterprise. The author additionally
examines the problems involved in the use of antitrust laws in the
regulation of labor unions.
INTRODUCTION
First, what ends do our antitrust laws seek to achieve? Second, just how
does current enforcement emphasis aim to promote these goals? Relevant
here, of course, are Antitrust Division's recent efforts to curb corporate
mergers which threaten competition, as well as its program for working
effectively with other branches of the federal, and state governments, to
protect the public against rigged bids on government purchases. Additionally,
the current, though necessarily limited, activity of the Antitrust Division in
applying the antitrust laws to illegal conduct by organized labor is also worthy
of mention. And, finally, reaching for some broad perspective on antitrust
enforcement, what if anything can be said about antitrust's impact on the
competitive system we prize?
I. THE ANTITRUST GOALS
Antitrust seeks to promote free markets by striking down privately
imposed clogs on free market operation. Under our enterprise system,
resources are allocated, goods produced, and prices set, in response to the
ebb and flow of consumer pressures exerted via free markets. Consumers
*Former Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Chief
of Antitrust Division 1959-1961; A.B., 1948, LL.B., 1952, Yale University.
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buy goods in markets. By so doing, they register consumer preference, mold
price as well as production decisions. If privately imposed clogs on free
markets insulate prices or production from consumer preferences, free market
functioning wanes. Such clogs-price-fixing or absorption of competitors that
unduly curb consumer choice-antitrust seeks to strike down.
As the Supreme Court has stated it more broadly:
[The antitrust laws were] designed to be a comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. . . . [They] rest on the premise
that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment con-
ducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.'
The public interest in competition "is closely akin to . . . the interest
protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any
kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly;
but we have staked upon it our all."'2
So much for a brief, very brief, sketch of antitrust's goals.
II. THE DIRECTION OF RECENT ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
In light of these goals, just what judgments underpin recent enforcement
emphasis? Initially, consider the Department's recent efforts to carry out the
congressional design for section 7 of the Clayton Acta-the statute that
outlaws any corporate acquisition that may substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly. Enacting this statute, the Congress intended,
as one court recently said:
(1) to limit future increases in the level of economic concentration
resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions; (2) to meet the
1. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
2. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943),
aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Comparable is the following view:
Antitrust is a distinctive American means for assuring the competitive economy
on which our political and social freedom under representative government
in part depend. These laws have helped release energies essential to our leadership
in industrial productivity and technological development. They reinforce our
ideal of careers open to superior skills and talent, a crucial index of a free
society ...
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust
Laws, p. 2.
3. The pertinent provision of § 7 of the Clayton Act reads as follows:
[No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
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threat posed by the merger movement to small business fields and
thereby aid in preserving small business as an important competitive
factor in the American economy; (3) to cope with monopolistic
tendencies in their incipiency and before they attain Sherman Act
proportions. . .4
Carrying out these goals, section 7 seems most apt. First, most broadly,
section 7 represents a prime weapon for prophylactic antitrust. Vigorous
section 7 enforcement in those sectors with great growth potentials can avoid
loss of competitive vigor via undue concentration. In short, judicious appli-
cation of section 7 in growing industries can avoid Sherman Act section 25
problems a decade or two from now. It is this very effort that Congress has
obliged federal antitrust enforcers to undertake.
Second, in carrying out this congressional design, section 7 is well suited.
Although both section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 2 of the Sherman
Act involve essentially structural issues, merger cases enable their present-
ation to courts in more manageable bites. On the one hand, today's typical
Sherman Act monopolization case likely involves court appraisal of the firm's
market power based on a whole series of acts perhaps long since done; explora-
tion of such diverse and, ofttimes, aged events may be lengthy and arduous.
Under section 7, in sharp contrast, inquiry focuses on one transaction-the
challenged acquisition. And the judicial task is to gauge that one transac-
tion's reasonably probable market consequences.
Third, perhaps for such reasons, section 7 cases can be tried more
promptly. In Youngstown-Bethlehem,6 for one perhaps atypical example,
the trial was completed some thirteen months or so after issue was joined.
In Brown Shoe,7 the trial took about eight weeks of actual court time. And,
in both the proposed Texaco-Superior merger8 as well as the recent Sohio-
Leonard case,9 defense counsel was informed that the United States would
4. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 583 (S.D.N.Y.1958).5. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
Section 4 of the Sherman Act authorizes the Attorney General to seek equitable
relief against violations of the Sherman Act.
6. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
7. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 729 (E.D. Mo. 1959),
Prob. iuris. noted, 363 U.S. 825 (1960).
8. This proposed merger between Texaco, Inc., and Superior Oil Co. was
abandoned after the Antitrust Division informed counsel for these companies that an
action would be filed challenging the merger if consummated. Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 25, 1959, p. 24.
9. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), Civil No. 19696, E.D. Mich.,
Dec. 31, 1959. The complaint in this case was dismissed without prejudice on January
22, 1960, following a stipulation by defendants that the proposed merger would be
abandoned.
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be prepared for trial within sixty days after completion of rather limited
discovery. These discovery moves in Sohio-Leonard'° were filed within one
week or so of the complaint. Finally, most recently, apt handling of dis-
covery moves in the recent Gamble-Skogmo-Western Auto merger11 proceed-
ing enabled satisfactory resolution of that matter within ninety days or so
after the complaint was filed.
This possibility for speed in litigation serves the public interest. Initially,
real savings in court trial time are one result. Another benefit stems from
minimizing burdens of litigation for parties involved.
Fourth, in addition to savings of time and money for both the Govern-
ment and defendants, section 7 litigation offers real promise for securing
effective relief. As the Supreme Court asserted in a Sherman Act context:' 2
A public interest served by . . . [antitrust] civil suits is that they
effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by
defendants' illegal restraints. If this decree accomplishes less than
that, the Government has won a lawsuit and lost a cause.
To remedy what it believed to be inadequacies in Sherman Act relief,
Congress specified in sections 1113 and 1513a of the Clayton Act that, on a
finding of a section 7 violation, divestiture is to be the general rule. True,
courts of equity have been vested with, and traditionally exercised, wide
discretion in fashioning appropriate relief. Equally true, however, the fact
that Congress has made its choice as to the nature of the relief to be granted
-divestiture of stock or assets illegally acquired-still leaves the equity court
wide discretion to determine the manner and means for effectuating the
congressional mandate.
The effectuation of this congressional design, perhaps more avoidable
under section 7 than under the Sherman Act, raises difficult problems of
unscrambling assets long since joined together. And when the legality of an
acquisition can be raised prior to consummation, relief problems diminish
still further.14
10. Ibid.
11. United States v. Gamble-Skogmo Inc., Civil No. 12776, W.D. Mo., April 1, 1960.
12. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
13. 72 Stat. 943 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
13a. 62 Stat. 909 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958).
14. In this context, the Antitrust Division sought to develop close liaison with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. As the Director of the SEC's Division of
Corporate Finance explained: "We have worked out over the years a fairly simple
procedure of 'being sure the Antitrust Division and the FTC know about the transaction.
Any prospectus or proxy statement involving a proposed merger, consolidation, or other
form of acquisition of a business where the transaction is in excess of $3,000,000 and
not subject to specific authorization by another federal agency . . . is brought to
the attention of these two agencies." Address by Byron D. Woodside, Director, Division
of Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, "Particular SEC Merger
Considerations," p. 24, Nov. 20, 1957.
Utilizing this and similar procedures, the Division seeks, albeit sometimes unsuccess-
fully, either to proceed-or at least notify merging companies of our intent to proceed-
prior to consummation. This policy is rooted in two considerations: First, courts can
more easily halt a transaction yet unconsummated than undo a merger already
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Finally, emphasis on section 7 enforcement, let us make crystal clear,
does not mean that all mergers are suspect. Some mergers may benefit
competition. Some mergers may threaten a market's competitive vigor. This
Congress has recognized. In amending section 7 of the Clayton Act,
Congress did not proscribe all acquisitions. Outlawed are only those acquisi-
tions that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.15
Beyond efforts to curb mergers that threaten competition, our program
to curb rigged bids on federal and state purchases has been stepped-up
sharply. Identical bidding sometimes marks federal, state, and local govern-
ment procurement. And such government procurement, in many instances,
is carried on via requests for competitive bids.
In this context of public procurement, then, enforcement of federal and
state antitrust laws takes on a special significance. Competitive bidding
cannot function when competitors agree to rig bids on government purchases.
To function effectively as an instrument of government procurement, com-
petitive bidding requires markets free of restraints and monopoly elements.
Only if the Federal and State Attorneys General succeed in maintaining
a favorably competitive climate through vigorous and effective enforcement
of the antitrust laws can all of us as taxpayers hope for the benefits of
competitive bidding.
The Congress, recognizing that competition was vital to the proper
conduct of federal government procurement, enacted legislation in 194716
setting up a continuing program of reporting of identical bids to the Attorney
General. Statutes oblige each federal agency to refer to the Attorney General
identical bids that point to an antitrust violation.
Reports of identical bidding, prepared in accordance with regulations
issued by the Armed Services and the General Services Administration, 17
constitute a stream of intelligence which pinpoints the locus of competitive
injury and adapts enforcement to the needs of various sectors of our economy.
In some areas, reports of suspected identical bids have triggered federal
antitrust proceedings. These proceedings, already brought, have involved
completed. Tasks of formulating a plan for divestiture are obviated. Second, considera-
tions of basic fairness suggest, where feasible, informing business concerns of intent to
sue before business commitments are ultimately finalized. Companies can then proceed,
if they will, with the knowledge that a suit, probably seeking a preliminary injunction,
will follow. Should concerns decide to proceed, the Division will take all reasonable
measures to enable prompt resolution of the legal issues raised.
15. See note 3 sufjra.
16. 10 U.S.C. § 2305(d) (1958).
17. Armed Services Procurement Regulation (1955 ed. Revised), 27 February 1959,
Revision Nos. 44 and 41 U.S.C.A. Appendix, Rules and Regulations, Sections 1-1.902
to 1-1.903.
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products that range from bread and milk to certain electrical items.'8 And
the public's right to competitive bidding, in appropriate areas has been
safeguarded.'
There are indications that a substantial volume of state and local gov-
ernment procurement has been similarly effected. In this light, we have
been working closely with interested state officials to help them protect the
people of their areas.
First, we are endeavoring to work with state purchasing agents to
set up procedures for sifting out identical bids that raise suspicion of anti-
trust violation. These officials are currently exploring the feasibility of
establishing procedures for spotting possibly rigged bids comparable to the
federal government's. Thus, states may develop some system for at least
finding out when state purchases have been affected by collusive bidding.
Second, we seek to help state Attorneys General, when state purchases
have been tainted by an antitrust violation, to secure recompense for their
states. In some antitrust cases brought by the federal government, the pri-
mary parties injured may be states or cities throughout the country.20 When
a state or city has been hurt by an antitrust violation, the law provides that
it may sue and recover treble damages.21 The Supreme Court has held that
Congress intended to grant the states a right to recover treble damages on
behalf of their citizens. 22
18. Several recent examples include United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., Crim.
No. 0315, D. Neb., Aug. 28, 1958, charging that three Omaha, Nebraska, dairies
engaged in a combination and conspiracy to eliminate and suppress competition in the
sale of dairy products to Offutt Air Force Base and the U.S. Veterans Hospital near
Omaha; United States v. Carter Products, Inc., 60 Civil No. 375, S.D.N.Y.,
Jan. 27, 1960, charging the two leading manufacturers of mild tranquilizers with
fixing prices on bids and excluding others from the manufacture and sale of
tranquilizers made with meprobamate as the sole active' ingredient; and three
indictments filed Feb. 16, 1960, charging General Electric Co., Westinghouse
Electric Corp., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., Federal Pacific
Electric Co. and 18 individuals with conspiracy, collusion, bid rigging and market
sharing in various heavy electrical products. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
Crim. No. 20234, E.D. Pa., Feb. 16, 1960; United States v. General Elec. Co., Crim.
No. 20235 E.D Pa., Feb. 16, 1960; United States v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., Crim.
No. 20236, E.D. Pa., Feb. 16, 1960. Since Feb. 16, 1960, a total of 17 additional
indictments have been returned in Philadelphia, affecting every major sector of the
electrical equipment industry.
19. The Omaha Dairy case (United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., supra note 18)
illustrates that favorable price results may be obtained in governmental procurement from
the initiation of antitrnst actions. In this case, it was observed that within a week
of the conclusion of our preliminary investigation one of the defendants, whose priceshad not deviated in three and one-half years of bidding on Air Force contracts,
submitted a bid 8 percent below its previous bid, affording the Government a saving
of $4,000 on one item alone. Substantial savings on other dairy product items were
obtained at the same time.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co., Crim. No. 59167-M,
D. Mass., Aug. 26, 1959. Defendants in this and two related cases entered pleas of
nolo contendere to the charges of the indictments, and were fined a total of $466,000.
21. Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
22. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942). See also Chattanooga Foundry Works
v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (municipal corporation as plaintiff).
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Though Congress intended this remedy, ofttimes it may be less than
fully effective. A state or city may know its citizens have been hurt, possibly
quite badly. But the resources to investigate and prove the antitrust con-
spiracy from which its damages stemmed may not be at hand.23
In light of this difficulty that the: states face, the Antitrust Division has
been considering means for handling its antitrust litigation with an eye
toward aiding state Attorneys General to protect the interest of injured states
or cities. Thus, assume a case in which states or cities have been hurt, and
where the courts have, over the Antitrust Division's objections, accepted
pleas of nolo contendere.24 In such cases, if a civil case is pending, the
Division is now appraising the wisdom of considering as one element of the
public interest test which guides acceptance or rejection of a civil decree,
the interest of a state or its subdivisions primarily injured by the violations
alleged. This means that, in appropriate cases, the Division has offered
defendants the alternative of proceeding to trial or accepting a consent decree
that protects the state's interests. Such cooperation between federal and state
law enforcement officials accords with a basic design for our federalism.
As the Supreme Court stated many decades ago: 25
We live in the jurisdiction of two sovereignties, each having its own
system of courts to declare and enforce its laws in common
territory. . . The situation requires, therefore, . . . a spirit of
reciprocal comity and mutual assistance to promote due and orderly
procedure.
And just this year the Court once more underscored these principles "of
reciprocal comity and mutual assistance" in the law enforcement area. "Free
and open cooperation between state and federal law enforcement officers"
the Court stated,26 "is to be commended and encouraged" and "forthright
cooperation . . . will be promoted and fostered."
It is entirely fitting, we suggest, that such federal-state "cooperation"
be manifest in the antitrust enforcement area. For, as Professor Kingman
Brewster recently expressed so well:
23. As the Attorney General of California recently stated, referring to a particular
case he had brought: "The defendants are all located in the Mississippi Valley or on
the Atlantic Seaboard. For the State of California to have undertaken the investigation
of this matter would have been prohibitively expensive as well as impracticable for
other reasons." Letter of Honorable Stanley Mosk, Attorney General of the State of
California, to Robert A. Bicks, August 20, 1960. .
In much the same vein, the Attorney General of Maine has flatly stated: "The
State of Maine is not equipped to uncover and evaluate information essential to theprosecufion of . . . multi-state conspiracies .... ." Telegram from Honorable Frank
S Hancock, Attorney General of the State of Maine, to Robert A. Bicks, August 22, 1960.24. Such pleas have been held to be inadmissible against a defendant in a
subsequent treble damage action brought by parties claiming to have been injuredby the antitrust violation. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366(D. Minn. 1939). See Clayton Act, § 5, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958),
which provides that a judgment or decree to the effect that defendant has violated
the antitrust laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in a private
action respecting the same matters.
25. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 259 (1922).
26. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221, 222 (1960).
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'The virtue of leaving considerable economic power' in numerous
private hands is not too dissimilar from the virtue of leaving consid-
erable political power in the several states of a federation. In the
negative sense both reject centralism. . . More important, both
exponents of states' rights and those who would leave economic
power in private hands are affirming that more socially constructive
energies will be released in the long run if problems can be
attacked by and left to the final decision of those living closest
to them. . . .. [Both seek] maximum play for diverse solutions
to comparative problems. 27
Finally, what about antitrust and organized labor? Here the task is to
accord proper emphasis to two somewhat discordant congressional policies.
"The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the other to
preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions through the
agency of collective bargaining. '28
Labor unions have always been held within the general purview of the
Sherman Act.29 However, under the rationale of the Norris-La Guardia
Act30 any trade union activity within section 20 of the Clayton Act 3' is
immunized from the operation of the Sherman Act when the union is acting
alone and in its own self-interest.3 2 But since trade unions do not enjoy an
all inclusive exemption from the Act,33 any combination with a non-labor
group renders the immunity dubious.3 4 Thus, a union, although employing
means authorized by section 20 of the Clayton Act, has no exemption when
it combines with businessmen who have the power and intent to eliminate
all competition among themselves and prevent competition from others,35
or when it combines with non-labor groups to fix prices, and thus effect an
unlawful restraint in commerce.36
More explicitly, labor's immunity is dependent on a factual determina-
tion of whether the union is acting in its own self-interest or conspiratorially
with non-labor groups that are intent on violating the antitrust laws.37
Therefore, if a union combines with business contractors to suppress com-
27. BREWSTER, THE CORPORATION AND ECONOMIC FEDERALISM 75-76, Chap. 4
of MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (1959).
28. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
806 (1945).
29. United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 414 (1947)
dissenting opinion); see, e.g., Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S.
295 (1925); Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
30. 47 Stat. 70-73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958).
31. 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
32. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
33. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.)(dictum), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
34. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (dictum); see United
States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 149 (1926).
35. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
36. Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oysterman's Ass'n v. United States, 236 F.2d 658(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956).
37. Anderson-Friberg, Inc. v. Justin R. Cleary & Sons, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 75(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (dictum).
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petition it is not immune from the provisions of the Sherman Act.35 Similarly,
when an association of businessmen makes an agreement aimed at substan-
tially restricting competition and controlling prices and markets, the inclusion
of labor provisions in the agreement does not immunize it from the Act,89
for benefits to unions cannot be used "as a cat's-paw to pull the employers'
chestnuts out of the antitrust fires."'40
Illustrative of union agreements with a non-labor entity which restrain
trade is the factual situation in United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n.
41
In this case, a Teamsters local and two of its officials were charged with
agreeing, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, that station operators
would refrain from giving premiums in connection with retail gasoline sales,
and would refrain from advertising the price for the retail sale of gasoline.
Dealers who gave premiums or advertised prices were picketed or threatened
with picketing, had gasoline deliveries cut off or were threatened with a
cut-off of deliveries, and were threatened with property damage. Many retail
gasoline station operators and their employees were members of the union
local.
United States v. Meyer Singer'2 is an example of the organization of a
labor union composed of independent businessmen as well as employees.
In this case, a group of self-employed peddlers, engaged in buying waste
grease from restaurants, hotels and other establishments, and in selling such
waste to processors, became members of a Teamsters local. The indictment,
returned by a federal grand jury, charged them with agreeing among them-
selves to fix the price they paid for waste grease and the price at which it was
to be sold to processors. It was also charged that the peddlers allocated
among themselves the establishments from which they would buy, and the
processors to whom they would sell. Processors were allegedly prevented from
buying from non-union peddlers and required to make payment into a
"health and welfare" fund for peddlers. Strikes and picketing and threats of
strikes and picketing were used to compel processors to adhere to the system,
and suspension and expulsion from the union were sanctions used to force
compliance by peddlers.
38. United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
39. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
40. Id. at 464.
41. Crim. No. 3010, N.D. Ind., June 22, 1959. A trial by the court resulted
in judgments of guilty against the union, the association, and one of the union
officials. These convictions are presently on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
42. Crim. No. 27691, S.D. Cal., May 27, 1959. This case was concluded by
the acceptance by the court of pleas of nolo contendere from all defendants on March 23,
1960. A companion civil case, seeking injunctive relief against the same violations is
currently pending. United States v. Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union,
Local 626, International Bhd. of -Teamsters, Civil No. 515-59-WB, S.D. Cal.,
May 27, 1959.
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United States v. Chicago Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n 43 represents an instance in
which corruption of union officials by employers for the purpose of restrain-
ing trade led to a Sherman Act indictment. In this case, the association and
its members, in the business of repairing and installing steel boilers, agreed
to fix their charges for boiler repair and installation work, and to prevent
nonmembers from engaging in the business. As a part of their plan, they
agreed with, and made sizable cash payments to, two business managers of
a local union. These business managers in return were to use their official
position to harass nonmember boiler contractors, and to refuse to enter into
collective bargaining agreements with them.
Thus, it is the Antitrust Division's duty to carry out this congressional
design by instituting cases which demonstrate conduct detrimental to our
antitrust policy while at the same time not being protected by the mantle of
privilege granted to unions to achieve traditional goals. In this selective
process we must be ever vigilant that neither policy is frustrated. 44
III. THE PERSPECTIVE OF ANTITRUST
Beyond these details what can we say about antitrust economy and the
need for continued vigorous enforcement?
In the context of our twentieth century free enterprise economy, the
need for a procompetitive public policy rests on two propositions.
First, there is some minimum level of competition which it is neces-
sary to achieve in the market-controlled sector if that sector is to be
allowed to remain a market-regulated rather than a government-
controlled one. Second, this level is not self-maintaining: in the
absence of antitrust, the level of competition will sink below the
minimum. . . . [A] complete absence of positive public policy
would lead to a drastic decline in the competitiveness of business.4 5
Both generalizations, of course, are slippery. Support in empirical data
is hard to come by. And what little empirical data can be found is even more
difficult to evaluate.
Consider the impact of antitrust on our country's economic develop-
ment. Dean Edward Mason recently stated:
43. Crim. No. 57 Cr. 412, N.D. I11., June 25, 1957. The case was concluded on
May 1, 1959, by pleas of nolo contendere from defendants.
44. In attempting more fully to utilize the potential of existing antitrust law
as it applies to labor unions, we must at the same time realize that other labor
practices beyond the scope of the antitrust laws have been considered at length by
Congress in the context of the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts. (29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 141 -97 (1960 Supp.)). It is our feeling that whatever Congress decides it wants
to outlaw or not should be done in a labor-management context rather than in an
antitrust context. But, we must not sell short what antitrust can do at present in the
labor field.
45. TURNER & KAYSEN, ANTITRUST POLICY-AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
4-5 (1959).
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American industries are less concentrated than similar industries
in many other countries, and general concentration is no higher-it
may even be somewhat lower-than in countries, showing a com-
parable degree of industrialization. . . . It is clear now, as it was
not clear before, that there is no inevitable historical force at work
that must produce, over any extended period of time, an increase
in the percent of economic activity accounted for by the largest
firms either in American manufacture or in the economy as a whole.
I think it has been demonstrated that between 1931 and 1947 there
was no substantial increase in concentration in manufacture, and at
least serious doubts have been cast on the existence of any such
tendency over the last fifty years. 46
These developments cannot generally be deemed unrelated to the past
half-century of antitrust law enforcement. As Dean Mason has recently
stated:
The structure of American industry and the behavior of firms are
markedly different than they would have been if Sherman, Clayton,
and Federal Trade were names unknown to the statute books ...
Cases against monopolization, it is true, have been few in number
and dissolutions have been even fewer. But countless mergers and
amalgamations that might well have taken place in the absence of
antitrust have been scotched in the office of corporate counsel. It is,
in fact, to the advice that lawyers give their clients that the laws
against monopoly must look for their chief impact.47
Reaching this conclusion, Dean Mason is not alone. As two other
thoughtful commentators recently concluded:
It is fairly clear from the cases that the antitrust law sets a standard
business conduct in respect to anti-competitive practices that is more
stringent than would exist in its absence. The relative freedom
from cartelization of American industry can also be attributed to the
present policy. And . . . the goals of business conduct have
probably been affected by the law.
48
Also much in point are the recent words of Mr. Cordiner, Chairman
of the Board of the General Electric Company:
The success of the American economy is largely due to the creation
of a business atmosphere that is founded on free markets and
intense competition at the market place. Any arrangement that
tends toward a system of cartels or price control or regulations by
competitors is recognized by the citizens of this country as a
deterrent to the present and future growth of our economy. It is for
this basic reason that public opinion has obliged the government,
regardless of the party in power, to enforce the antitrust laws very
aggressively-in the public interest.49
46. Id. at 42-43.
47. TURNER & KAYSEN, ANTITRUST POLICY- AN ECONOMIC AND LECAL ANALYSIS(1959). Preface by Edward S. Mason, pp. xi, xii.
48. TURNER & KAYSEN, op. cit. supra note 47 at 6.
49. Quoted in Smith, What Antitrust Means Under Mr. Bicks, Fortune, March1960, p. 20.
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It is this role in promoting our goals for economic endeavor that anti-
trust must seek to play. Specific contours and content of any 'enforcement
program, of course, raise questions of judgment and policy. The focus today,
however, is not on those problems-but rather on the broad purpose antitrust
enforcement plays. It is antitrust's role in preserving that economic system
which has been, and should continue to be, significant.
